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ABRSTRACT 
 
 
 In the past several decades, saving for retirement has significantly changed, with the large 
replacement of Defined Contribution for Defined Benefit plans, as well as the unreliability of 
Social Security given the aging population. This paper analyzes retirement wealth across three 
generational cohorts—Baby Boomers (1946-1964), Gen Xers (1965-1980), and Millennials 
(1981-2000)—in order to compare preparedness and determine whether or not younger cohorts 
have compensated for the future unreliability of other traditional retirement income sources. The 
results suggest that levels of retirement wealth do not significantly differ across cohorts at all age 
profiles. Therefore, younger generational cohorts have not increased the amount of personal 
saving in order to maintain their pre-retirement standards of living throughout retirement. These 
results indicate that a change in saving structure and policy may be necessary to ensure that 
younger cohorts retire out of poverty. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
It is said that retirement saving is a three legged stool—Social Security, employer 
pensions, and private savings. Changing demographics, employment patterns, governmental 
regulation, and the overall financial landscape in the United States, however, have challenged the 
foundation to this metaphorical stool. Moreover, the reliability of two of these three legs—Social 
Security and employer pensions—has weakened, which has and will continue to obstruct the 
conventional path toward retirement preparedness for many individuals and families in younger 
generations. Moreover, younger and future generations will have to increase personal retirement 
savings to remain on track for retirement. In my research, I analyze retirement wealth and 
preparedness at the same points in the lifecycle for recent birth cohorts, including Baby Boomers 
(1946-1964), Gen Xers (1965-1980), and Millennials (1981-2000). The overarching question this 
research seeks to answer is: are the generations that cannot rely as much on Social Security and 
Defined Benefit plans making any progress in terms of saving independently? This research will 
therefore shed light on the effectiveness of the current saving structure and reveal if and how the 
structure should be reformed.  
Because there are so many aging Baby Boomers, retirement saving, wealth, and 
preparedness are extremely important considerations; luckily, many of these aging Boomers will 
rely on Defined Benefit (DB) pensions for primary retirement income. Younger cohorts, 
however, will not be able to primarily rely on such pensions, given the shift from DB to Defined 
Contribution (DC) plans in the 1990s due to increased job mobility, government regulation, and 
liability risk from recent economic downturns (Nekola, 2014). Occurring simultaneously to the 
aging crisis, the shift to DC plans has moved retirement planning risk from corporations to 
individuals, many of who are financially illiterate. Therefore, retirement savings is now primarily 
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dependent upon employees’ personal contribution behavior and investment choices. 
Consequently, DB pensions are unlikely to be available as retirement income sources for 
younger generations, requiring such generations to significantly increase personal saving. 
Given the aging crisis, younger cohorts also may be less able to rely on Social Security. 
Currently, Social Security is a substantial income stream for many retirees, as nearly 61 million 
people will receive approximately $918 billion in benefits in 2016 (SSA, 2016). Of those 61 
million beneficiaries, 48 percent of married couples and 71 percent of unmarried individuals rely 
on Social Security for more than 50 percent of their income, and 21 percent of married couples 
and 43 percent of unmarried individuals rely on their benefits for over 90 percent of their income 
(SSA, 2016). As a result of increases in disability claimers, decreases in U.S. Treasury yields 
from recent stagnant growth, and decreases in the worker to beneficiary ratio, by 2033 the Social 
Security trust fund will be exhausted and only 76 percent of scheduled benefits will be able to be 
paid out (SSA, 2016). Therefore, unless significant reforms are passed, Social Security benefits 
will continue to become an increasingly unreliable retirement income source for younger 
generations. 
With the increasing unreliability of both Social Security and employer pension plans, my 
research sheds light upon whether or not the younger generations, Gen Xers and Millennials, 
have made any increases in retirement savings through DC and other private savings platforms, 
in comparison to Baby Boomers. I utilize data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF) from years 1989 through 2013 to statistically and graphically analyze the 
differences in various retirement saving metrics across the three cohorts at certain points in the 
life cycle. Given this data, my research more specifically concentrates on the fact that younger 
generations will lack the reliability of DB employer pensions. This research therefore sheds light 
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upon the ineffectiveness of the current saving structure and reveals that the structure should be 
reformed. Additionally, given the demographic crisis with aging Baby Boomers and that, 
worldwide, there will be over one billion people over the age of 60 by 2020 and almost two 
billion by 2050, my research is important to understand how the change in nature of retirement 
saving will manifest across generational cohorts, as so many aging individuals will no doubt 
have significant effects on the economy (Bloom, Canning & Fink, 2011). 
In Section II, I review the important literature to provide relevant background to the topic 
and shed light upon how this paper will enhance such research. Section III describes the data and 
develops the methodology. Section IV provides a discussion of the statistical and graphical 
results of my research. Section V concludes that the differences in retirement assets, particularly 
throughout the cohorts’ 30s and 40s, is not significantly different, which suggests that younger 
generations are not compensating by increasing DC nor private savings despite the future 
unreliability of employer pensions and Social Security. 
 
II.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
A vast amount of literature, dating from the 1980s to present day, discusses the economic 
implications of current demographic trends and savings behavior in the United States. The 
majority of this literature primarily studies how the aging population will affect the economy, as 
well as Franco Modigliani’s life cycle hypothesis (1954), which theorizes that consumption is 
smoothed out over the course of an individual’s life, meaning that one dissaves when he is 
young, saves when he is middle-aged and in his prime working years, and finally dissaves in 
retirement. While these studies provide important empirical evidence for various economic 
theories and implications, they lack a comparison of saving behavior of different cohorts while 
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keeping age constant, which is necessary to do for public policy regarding Social Security, 
healthcare, and other welfare programs. Nevertheless, there are a few studies that have begun to 
more precisely compare cohorts’ retirement saving behavior and preparedness. Ultimately, my 
research builds upon this growing body of empirical work by more explicitly examining and 
comparing cohorts’ retirement wealth at certain points in the lifecycle, keeping age constant. 
This literature review discusses cross-cohort analyses of retirement saving and preparedness, and 
then reviews studies specifically focused on the effects of aging on saving, economic growth, 
and retirement wealth. 
 
Cross-Cohort Retirement Saving 
With the financial crisis and subsequent Great Recession of 2007 to 2009, all 
generational cohorts have struggled to accumulate wealth in their attempts to ensure retirement 
preparedness. Therefore, Munnell, Hou, and Webb (2014) use the National Retirement Risk 
Index (NRRI) to analyze the age at which the vast majority of American households will be 
equipped to retire (Munnell et al, 2014). The NRRI, a measure of American households that are 
“at risk” of being underprepared to maintain their pre-retirement standard of living in retirement, 
is calculated by comparing households’ projected replacement rates, or the retirement income as 
a share of lifetime earnings, with target rates that would enable them to maintain their living 
standards throughout retirement. Retirement income consists of financial wealth, pensions, 
defined contribution/401(k) wealth, Social Security, and housing, and assumes people retire at 
age 65. This study finds that, in wake of the Great Recession, 52 percent of 2013’s working 
households were considered at risk of being unprepared for retirement (Munnell et al, 2014). 
Older cohorts are significantly more prepared for retirement than their younger counterparts, as 
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59 percent households aged 30-39 in 2013 were considered at risk of being unable to maintain 
pre-retirement standard of living in retirement, while only 45 percent of households aged 50-59 
would be at risk in the same year (Munnell et al, 2014). This finding is particularly important to 
my research question, as Munnell et al. (2014) analyzes the effects of aging on retirement wealth 
on a cross-cohort level, and ultimately finds that younger cohorts are significantly less prepared 
for retirement than their older counterparts. 
In addition to Munnell et al (2014), several studies have analyzed savings behavior, 
wealth levels, and retirement preparedness by cohort, including DeVaney and Chiremba (2005), 
Fidelity (2016), and Financial Finesse (2016). 
In an effort to test two different savings behavior theories, the life cycle hypothesis and 
theory of planned behavior, DeVaney and Chiremba (2005) employ a cross-cohort analysis of 
the savings behavior of the Swing Cohort (1928-1945), Older Boomers (1946-1954), Younger 
Boomers (1955-1964), and Gen X and Y (1965-1987). The theory of planned behavior, which 
may coincide with the life cycle hypothesis, is a psychological theory, suggesting that 
individuals are more likely to behave consistently with their intentions when they have control 
over the factors involved. Moreover, if individuals have been previously involved in savings 
behavior, he or she will be more likely to save in the future. Therefore, the LCH and theory of 
planned behavior may both hold, but within certain age groups, only certain people behavior the 
way we expected based upon the control or perceived control they have. Using data from the 
2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), DeVaney and Chiremba (2005) conducted Chi-
squared tests after regressing logistic and tobit models in which retirement savings was a 
function of attitude, subjective norms, perceived control, and past experience, in order to 
compare savings behavior of Baby Boomers to that of other age cohorts. Ultimately, the results 
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support both Modigliani’s life cycle hypothesis and the theory of planned behavior. On the one 
hand, the life cycle hypothesis was supported, as the youngest generations were least likely to 
hold a retirement account and the older cohorts were most likely to have the most savings in their 
respective accounts. At the same time, the theory of planned behavior was also supported, as 
increased tolerance for risk when saving or investing, reporting being a saver, being married, 
more education, being a homeowner, and reporting spending less than income were all 
significantly related to having a retirement account and the amount saved in such account. 
While DeVaney and Chiremba (2005) utilize a cohort analytical framework to study 
savings behavior, Fidelity and Financial Finesse studies employ cohort analyses to uncover 
specifics about retirement preparedness. The Fidelity biennial study (2016) calculates a single 
score, similar to the NRRI, which measures a household’s ability to cover expenses throughout 
retirement, in order to analyze Americans’ cross-generational retirement preparedness. The 
findings strongly support Modigliani’s life cycle hypothesis. While the number of people able to 
afford essential expenses during retirement has increased by 7 percent since 2013, 55 percent of 
households are unprepared to cover all of their living expenses during retirement, such as 
housing, food, and health care (Fidelity, 2016). Millennials have shown the greatest increase in 
their average savings rate, saving 7.5 percent compared to 5.8 percent in 2013, which reflects 
how increasing numbers of Millennials are entering the workforce and therefore now have a 
greater ability to save. While Gen Xers and Baby Boomers still save a greater percentage of their 
income than Millennials, these two cohorts have not experienced increased rates of saving. 
Nevertheless, Millennials still need to improve their saving behavior in order to remain on track 
for retirement—while they are nearly caught up to Gen Xers, they still remain 12 points behind 
Baby Boomers on the retirement preparedness scale. 
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Similar to Fidelity (2016), Financial Finesse (2016) examines the instability of retirement 
preparedness across three cohorts—Baby Boomers, Gen Xers, and Millennials. According to the 
study, Baby Boomers have shown the largest increase since 2014 (from 17 to 20 percent) in 
being unaware of their retirement preparedness, having debt management issues, lacking long-
term care insurance, and generally struggling to make investment decisions (Financial Finesse, 
2016). Nevertheless, Boomers still remain the best-positioned cohort for retirement. Contrarily, 
Gen X has increased awareness of retirement savings and investing, and is the only birth cohort 
to have significantly increased the number of individuals who are on track for retirement since 
2014 (up 2 percent). At the same time however, Gen X has displayed increasing issues with 
money management, as well as declining homeownership, insurance, and estate planning, which 
can be attributed to competing financial priorities between children’s education and parent’s 
retirement. Finally, Millennials’ finances reflect myopic prioritization of short term over the long 
term, as 61 percent are on top of their short-term credit, while only 43 percent of non-sponsored 
workers save. Moreover, Millennials continue to fall behind in retirement planning and 
investing, as many lack not only DB plans, but in fact any employer-sponsored retirement 
benefits at all.  
 
The Aging Population, Saving & Economic Growth 
Overall, the literature regarding cross-cohort retirement wealth is fairly united around the 
current status of the various generations’ preparedness, with the eldest generations more 
prepared than their succeeding cohorts, as predicted by the life cycle hypothesis. Therefore, 
because differences in savings behavior and general retirement preparedness across generations 
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exist, it is also important to consider economic research around the relationship and effects of the 
aging population on the return on assets, levels of saving, and economic growth. 
Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989), Disney (1996), and McKinsey & Company (2005) all 
suggest that the aging population is associated with lower saving rates, slower investment 
growth, and reduced growth rates of gross domestic product. Therefore, these adverse effects 
suggest two principal issues relevant to my research study. First, it is possible that the reduction 
in the return on assets, as an adverse effect of the aging population, has lowered each cohort’s 
saving rate by reducing their incentive to save, as well as the rate at which those savings can 
grow. Additionally, Northwestern Mutual (2016) found in a study that younger generations favor 
overly conservative financial planning approaches, which also may contribute to lower return on 
assets. Second, given the slowdown in macroeconomic growth due to the aging population, there 
is a reduced amount of available funds to save for retirement. Both of these greater economic 
effects of the aging population therefore pose threats and possible explanations for decreases in 
retirement wealth across generations. Overall, while the exact magnitude of negative effects on 
the economy by the aging population is disputed, numerous economic studies suggest that the 
aging population has reduced the return on assets and therefore the savings rate, as well has 
reduced the available funds to save because of its adverse effects on economic growth. 
 
Wrap Up: Literature Review 
Upon reviewing literature that regarding generational retirement wealth and 
preparedness, the aging population, and the effects on economic growth, there is a clear 
opportunity to enrich such studies by analyzing retirement savings behavior and general 
retirement preparedness on a cross-cohort basis, keeping age constant. While the current 
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literature provides a lot of useful information regarding savings theories and potential impacts on 
gross domestic product (GDP), these studies have not yet provided an adequate or fair 
comparison of current and future retirement wealth and preparedness across generations. 
Moreover, this research is necessary because as saving theories such as the Modigliani’s life 
cycle hypothesis explain, it is inevitable that the eldest generations have accumulated the greatest 
retirement wealth thus far, especially as many Millennials have not yet entered the workforce. 
Therefore, this paper compares retirement wealth of older generations to that of younger cohorts, 
and in doing so, determines if younger cohorts are making any progress in terms of saving at the 
same ages. 
 
III.   METHODOLOGY 
In my research, I utilize data sets from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF), which was used in DeVaney and Chiremba (2005). First conducted in 1983, this 
triennial, cross-sectional survey collects data on U.S. families’ assets and liabilities. Each survey 
consists of a sample size of about 6,500 families and contains a variety of data variables relevant 
to my research question. 
More specifically, I use the SCF’s summary extract data sets from the years 1989, 1992, 
1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013, which all contain variables inflation-adjusted to 
2013 dollars. These extract data sets were first created in 1989, and provide key variables of 
interest to my study. Additionally, each data set uses multiple imputations to supply estimates for 
any missing data points. I use all available SCF extract variable data sets in order to capture the 
greatest overlap between the three cohorts, as well as allow each cohort to more significantly age 
between each survey. 
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Utilizing Stata, I appended the five data sets, assigned the correct birth cohort to each 
observation depending on year of the survey and age reported, top-coded the seven key financial 
metrics to the value of the 98th percentile to prevent outliers from skewing my results, and 
finally calculated means and medians of wealth and saving variables for every age for every 
cohort. After calculating this macroeconomic data from the microeconomic survey, my analysis 
concentrates on seven key variables which relate to various forms of retirement saving, as well as 
other measures of wealth such as financial assets, home equity, and net worth. Table 1 provides a 
set of descriptions for each key variable conducted in my analysis. I then break down the 
analysis further by incorporating other demographic factors such as race, college degree 
attainment, marital status, sex, and number of children. Overall, the statistical and graphical 
analysis I conduct attempts to shed light upon the research question at stake: how do younger 
cohorts’ retirement wealth compare to that of older cohorts at certain points in the life cycle? 
One additional and important note about this research is that because many Millennials 
have not yet begun working, and because the SCF was only first conducted in 1983, data of 
younger Millennials and older Baby Boomers will not be captured in this analysis. Table 2 
captures this information in a timeline of the cohorts’ ages at each SCF’s year. The youngest 
Baby Boomers captured in the various surveys are 25, and the oldest Millennials captured are 32. 
Therefore, Baby Boomers often have higher averages throughout their 20s, given the lack of data 
from their earliest working years, and Millennials often have skewed lower averages in their 30s, 
given the lack of data from most of their 30s. Therefore, in order to compare cohorts with the 
most overlap of age profiles, I often only compare Gen Xers to Millennials in their 20s, as Baby 
Boomer data is subject to outliers, and I often only compare Gen Xers to Baby Boomers 
throughout their 30s and 40s. While the Baby Boomer cohort does not overlap with Gen Xers 
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nor Millennials throughout their 50s and 60s, I include this data, as understanding how 
retirement wealth progresses as Boomers age is a useful part of understanding trends, and a key 
ingredient in projecting how retirement wealth will progress for subsequent cohorts. 
Additionally, as seen in Table 2, I impose an age restriction in my analysis, in which I only 
consider individuals who are at least 18 years old. 
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IV. RESULTS 
General Saving by Cohort 
 To begin a discussion of the statistical and graphical analysis of this study, I have created 
a line graph of the mean total value of savings accounts held by households excluding money 
market assets across age for each cohort, as seen in Figure 1. Median saving figures were omitted 
for this variable, as the graph was subject to outliers, given the fact many individuals lacked any 
savings at all. While the majority of previous research has indicated that younger generations 
seem to be less prepared in terms of retirement saving than elder cohorts, this data suggest that 
younger cohorts are outsaving older cohorts. 
 
Figure 1. Mean Total Saving Across Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
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As seen in Figure 1, in their early 20s, Gen Xers saved on average $1,458, while 
Millennials on average saved $2,416. Throughout their 30s, Baby Boomers saved on average 
$4,985, while Gen Xers saved on average $6,929. Finally, in their 40s, Baby Boomers and Gen 
Xers saved on average $11,402 and $14,704, respectively. Therefore, this data suggest that 
younger cohorts have slightly strengthened total saving behavior in comparison to elder 
generations throughout their 20s, 30s, and 40s. This finding is interesting, given that the majority 
of economic research, as well as my own analysis below, suggest that younger cohorts end up 
with less retirement wealth. Therefore, because cohorts are seemingly saving more but ending up 
with less retirement wealth, this data suggest that younger cohorts face lower returns on assets, 
given their lag behind in retirement wealth.  
 
Retirement Wealth Accumulation by Cohort 
 To analyze retirement wealth, I have created line graphs showing various retirement 
wealth metrics across age for each cohort. Figures 2 and 3 show median and mean total 
retirement liquid assets and total retirement liquid assets without pension wealth, respectively. 
Figure 5 shows mean IRA, Keogh, and Thrift, or DC, assets, for each cohort across age profiles. 
Median figures in Figure 4 were omitted, as the graph was largely affected by outliers, given 
varying rates of participation in DC plans. Appendix A provides mean (or median if noted) 
values for each variable, cohort, and age. Additionally, Appendix B provides participation rates 
for both DC and DC plans. 
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Figure 2. Median and Mean Total Liquid Retirement Assets Across Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
 
Figure 3. Median and Mean Liquid Retirement Assets Without Pensions Across Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
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Figure 4. Mean IRA/Keogh and DC Account Assets Across Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
 
 
The above graphs generally indicate that with regards to the various retirement wealth 
metrics, throughout one’s 20s, 30s, and 40s, retirement preparation behavior does not vastly 
differ across the three cohorts, though the eldest generations generally have accumulated slightly 
more wealth than younger cohorts. 
More specifically, with regard to total retirement liquid assets in Figure 2, when the 
various cohorts were in their 20s, Baby Boomers accumulated on average $8,773, whereas Gen 
Xers accumulated $5,832 and Millennials accumulated $3,528. This data overall suggest that 
retirement liquid assets throughout their 20s were statistically similar, with elder cohorts slightly 
ahead. 
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In their 30s, Baby Boomers, Gen Xers, and Millennials accumulated total retirement 
assets on average of $41,401, $57,671, and $15,827, respectively. These numbers, as well as the 
graph depicted in Figure 2, suggest that Gen Xers have steadily accumulated slightly more total 
liquid retirement wealth than the Baby Boomers throughout their 30s. While there is greater 
discrepancy between the two elder cohorts and the Millennials, these average numbers are 
slightly misleading, as previously explained, as the data only capture Millennials aged 30 to 32 
(this caveat is consistent for all graphs shown and is the reason I may exclude values for 
Millennials during their 30s). Therefore, compared to Baby Boomers and Gen Xers in their early 
30s, Millennials have similar retirement asset accumulation. 
Finally, in their 40s, Baby Boomers and Gen Xers accumulated total retirement assets on 
average of $168,634 and $128,445, respectively. The accumulation trend throughout their 30s 
therefore reversed in their 40s, with Baby Boomers accumulating more liquid retirement wealth 
than Gen Xers by a slightly larger margin than the difference between the two cohorts in their 
30s. 
Similar to Figure 2, Figure 3 depicts comparable trends of the same metric, liquid 
retirement assets across cohorts, but excludes current and future pension wealth. This metric is 
critical to understand how younger generations are compensating for the decreased future 
reliability of DB retirement plans. Disregarding the slight uptick in Baby Boomers’ assets in 
their late 20s, this data suggest that retirement wealth excluding pension wealth is comparable 
across the generations throughout their 20s. Throughout their 30s, Gen Xers steadily accumulate 
more assets than Baby Boomers; however, this trend reverses in their 40s when Baby Boomers 
steadily demonstrate higher accumulation of assets compared to the Gen Xers. Overall, in 
comparison to Figure 2’s total retirement liquid assets, Figure 3’s figures excluding pension 
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wealth are slightly lower in value, which is expected, as most pension wealth is accumulated 
later in the life cycle. While the values are lower, Figure 3 demonstrates how retirement assets 
excluding pensions are not significantly different, as well as that the general trends in retirement 
assets when including or excluding pension wealth are almost identical. Therefore, this data 
suggest that the younger generations have not accumulated significantly more retirement wealth 
with the exclusion of pension wealth than the Baby Boomers—this finding prompts significant 
concerns for the future retirement preparedness of the younger cohorts. 
To understand these differences between trends in total liquid retirement assets including 
and excluding pension wealth, it is pertinent to examine the trends for IRA, Keogh, and Thrift, or 
DC, assets in Figure 4, as younger cohorts could increase private saving via these retirement 
saving platforms, given the future unreliability of DB and Social Security income. In their 20s, 
Baby Boomers, Gen Xers, and Millennials on average accumulated IRA, Keogh, and DC assets 
of $8,238, $3,492, and $3,315, respectively. In their 30s, Baby Boomers, Gen Xers, and 
Millennials accumulated average assets of $38,015, $41,955, and $15,024, respectively. In their 
40s, Baby Boomers and Gen Xers accumulated average assets of $142,566 and $116,421, 
respectively. This data suggest that while Gen Xers slightly outsaved Baby Boomers in their 
mid-30s, elder generations have accumulated more IRA, Keogh and DC combined assets than 
younger generations. The cohorts, however, do slightly trade off between IRA and Keogh assets 
and DC assets, as Boomers demonstrate less DC saving, but more IRA and Keogh saving, 
especially compared to Xers throughout their 30s and 40s. Overall, Figure 4 suggests that 
younger generations are not accumulating a more significant amount of private retirement wealth 
through their 20s, 30s, and 40s as compared to the Baby Boomers. 
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Figure 4’s implications are important to discuss within the context of changing 
participation rates in DC and DB plans, which can be found in Appendix B. Particularly apparent 
when comparing participation rates of Baby Boomers and Gen Xers, participation rates in DC 
plans have increased for younger cohorts, while DB participation rates have declined, especially 
throughout the cohorts’ 30s and 40s. For example, in their 30s, DC plan participation for Baby 
Boomers and Gen Xers were 40 and 42.4 percent, respectively, while DB plan participation for 
the two cohorts were 28.3 and 17.5 percent, respectively. Therefore, while DC plan participation 
has increased for younger generations in comparison to elder cohorts, and while DC asset 
accumulation has slightly strengthened for Gen Xers as compared to Baby Boomers, overall 
IRA, Keogh, and DC assets together have fallen behind that of elder generations, even when 
accounting for age. This is concerning, as IRA and Keogh assets are typically rolled over DC 
assets from past employers or saving by people who are not offered DC plans. Overall, this data 
suggest increased participation rates, but smaller balances in such plans for younger cohorts as 
compared to elder cohorts.  
  
Total Wealth Accumulation by Cohort 
 In addition to examining retirement saving across cohorts, it is important to consider 
other forms of wealth, which the various cohorts have prioritized differently, and which could 
potentially be tapped into for retirement income. Therefore, I have created line graphs showing 
the trends in net worth, financial assets, and home equity across age for all cohorts. These 
metrics are useful to examine in the context of the cohorts’ retirement trends, as they may 
insinuate reasons for different levels of retirement wealth at different ages. Figures 5, 6, and 7 
display the median and mean net worth, total financial assets, and total primary home equity 
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across ages for all cohorts, respectively. Additionally, Appendix A provides mean (or median if 
noted) values for each variable, cohort, and age. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Median and Mean Net Worth Across Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
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Figure 6. Median and Mean Total Financial Assets Across Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
 
Figure 7. Median and Mean Total Home Equity for Primary Residence Across Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
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Similar to the trends in retirement wealth, the above graphs generally indicate that Gen 
Xers fall behind Baby Boomers with respect to net worth, financial assets, and home equity 
across all age profiles. Additionally, the graphs reveal that Millennials fall behind both elder 
cohorts more significantly with respect to all three mean metrics in their late 20s and early 30s. 
With respect to net worth, my analysis concentrates on the median net worth figures, as 
the mean analysis, despite top-coding the data, is misleading with outliers skewing the data. 
Throughout their 20s, Baby Boomers, Gen Xers, and Millennials accumulated median net worth 
of $14,209, $8,444, and $5,750, respectively. Furthermore, as depicted in Figure 5, throughout 
their early 20s, all three cohorts demonstrated similar net worth accumulation; however, in their 
late 20s and early 30s, Gen Xers and Baby Boomers increased their net worth in comparison to 
Millennials, with Baby Boomers having the greatest net worth. This trend continues throughout 
their 30s with Baby Boomers and Gen Xers accumulating median net worth of $91,678 and 
$52,223, respectively. Finally, in their 40s, the gap in net worth between the Baby Boomers and 
Gen Xers continues to widen, with the two cohorts accumulating median net worth of $316,983 
and $168,545, respectively. Overall, net worth data suggest that elder generations have greater 
median net worth across all age profiles. 
 Breaking down this net worth analysis by examining median total financial assets is 
useful to analyze what has influenced the trends in net worth across the three cohorts. 
Furthermore, total financial assets could be tapped into as future retirement income with capital 
gains and interest, and therefore it is an important metric to analyze with respect to retirement 
wealth and preparedness. Figure 6 captures this analysis of total financial assets across cohorts. 
In their 20s, Baby Boomers, Gen Xers, and Millennials accumulated median financial assets of 
$3,341, $2,804, and $2,645, respectively. In their 30s, Baby Boomers and Gen Xers accumulated 
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median financial assets of $22,220 and $15,652, respectively. In their 40s, Baby Boomers and 
Gen Xers accumulated $96,273 and $61,899, respectively. This data suggest that the older 
generations have on average slightly more total financial assets than younger generations, and 
this gap in assets widens as the cohorts age. This trend may therefore also indicate how 
successive generations face lower returns on assets compared to elder cohorts. 
 In addition to total financial assets across the three cohorts, home equity is also an 
important component of net worth to examine, as it is often a large portion of one’s total net 
worth, as well as a potential future source for retirement income through a reverse mortgage. 
Mean home equity data in Figure 7 generally show how older generations have greater home 
equity, especially as cohorts age into their 40s. In their 20s, Baby Boomers, Gen Xers, and 
Millennials had average home equities of $30,663, $13,105 and $9,537, respectively. In their 
30s, Baby Boomers and Gen Xers had average home equities of $105,711 and $109,672, 
respectively. It is interesting to note that average home equity of Gen Xers slightly surpasses that 
of Baby Boomers at this point in the life cycle; however, from median analysis, Gen Xers 
actually lag behind Baby Boomers. Finally, in their 40s, Baby Boomers and Gen Xers had 
average home equities of $341,740 and $231,116, respectively. Overall, mean home equity data 
suggest that older generations have greater home equity, especially as the cohorts age into their 
40s. The data also suggest that Millennials more significantly lag behind the elder cohorts during 
their late 20s and early 30s. These lower mean figures for younger generations, however, are not 
extremely surprising given lower homeownership rates of younger cohorts across all age 
profiles, as shown in Appendix G. 
Furthermore, Figure 7 reflects the tendency for younger generations to rent rather than 
buy throughout their 20s, 30s and 40s. Therefore, the data suggest that younger generations are 
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not investing in real estate as alternate means of future retirement income. Many factors have 
contributed to this trend, especially since the Great Recession. Many young Gen Xers and aging 
Millennials have struggled to access affordable mortgages as easily as elder generations, giving 
declining numbers of young people getting first mortgages (Hancock & Passmore, 2011).  
Additionally, many Gen Xers and Millennials have struggled with competing financial priorities 
of both paying down payments and simultaneously saving for retirement—many Gen Xers and 
Millennials fail at both (Financial Finesse, 2016). Additionally, Gen Xers bear the additional 
burden of competing financial priorities between expensive elderly care costs for their aging 
parents and increasing education costs for their children (Financial Finesse, 2016). Finally, 
Millennials face high costs of living in places in which they want to settle down, such as New 
York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Washington D.C., which all have significant Millennial 
populations, as well as are ranked in the top fifteen least affordable places to both buy and rent 
(Davidson, 2014). 
 
Retirement Wealth by Race, College, Sex, Marriage, and Number of Children 
 In addition to my overall study of the seven key wealth variables in my study, I further 
break down my analysis by examining the differences between total retirement liquid assets and 
retirement assets excluding pension wealth by the following demographic sub-groups: race, 
college, sex, marital status, and number of children. Similar to my previous analysis, I have 
created line graphs comparing retirement assets, both including and excluding pension wealth, 
for Baby Boomers, Gen Xers, and Millennials for each sub-demographic category. Figures 9, 10, 
11, and 12 depict mean total retirement liquid assets and mean total retirement liquid assets 
excluding pension wealth for White, Black, Hispanic, and Other survey respondents, 
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respectively. Figures 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 depict the same two variables for respondents who 
are college graduates, non-college graduates, married, single or not living with a partner males, 
and single or not living with a partner females, respectively. Finally, Figures 18, 19, 20, and 21 
depict the two variables for respondents with no children, one child, two children, and three or 
more children, respectively. For supplemental information regarding means and medians for 
cohorts, demographic sub-groups, and ages, see Appendices C, D, E, and F. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Mean Total Retirement Liquid Assets and Mean Liquid Retirement Assets 
Without Pensions, Across Age for White Respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
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Figure 10. Mean Total Retirement Liquid Assets and Mean Liquid Retirement Assets 
Without Pensions, Across Age for Black Respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
 
 
Figure 11. Mean Total Retirement Liquid Assets and Mean Liquid Retirement Assets 
Without Pensions, Across Age for Hispanic Respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
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Figure 12. Mean Total Retirement Liquid Assets and Mean Liquid Retirement Assets 
Without Pensions, Across Age for Other Respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
 
Figure 13. Mean Total Retirement Liquid Assets and Mean Liquid Retirement Assets 
Without Pensions, Across Age for College Graduates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
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Figure 14. Mean Total Retirement Liquid Assets and Mean Liquid Retirement Assets 
Without Pensions, Across Age for Non-College Graduates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
 
 
Figure 15. Mean Total Retirement Liquid Assets and Mean Liquid Retirement Assets 
Without Pensions, Across Age for Married Respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
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Figure 16. Mean Total Retirement Liquid Assets and Mean Liquid Retirement Assets 
Without Pensions, Across Age for Single Male Respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
 
 
Figure 17. Mean Total Retirement Liquid Assets and Mean Liquid Retirement Assets 
Without Pensions, Across Age for Single Female Respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
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Figure 18. Mean Total Retirement Liquid Assets and Mean Liquid Retirement Assets 
Without Pensions, Across Age for Respondents With No Children 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
 
Figure 19. Mean Total Retirement Liquid Assets and Mean Liquid Retirement Assets 
Without Pensions, Across Age for Respondents With One Child 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
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Figure 20. Mean Total Retirement Liquid Assets and Mean Liquid Retirement Assets 
Without Pensions, Across Age for Respondents With Two Children 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
 
Figure 21. Mean Total Retirement Liquid Assets and Mean Liquid Retirement Assets 
Without Pensions, Across Age for Respondents With Three or More Children 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
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 From Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12, total retirement assets, both including and excluding 
pension wealth, for White, Black, Hispanic, and Other respondents, mirror my original overall 
analysis of the two variables, with all three cohorts demonstrating fairly comparable asset 
accumulation both including and excluding pension wealth. Therefore, none of the four racial 
sub-groups of younger cohorts demonstrate a significant increase in retirement asset 
accumulation, despite the fact that DB plans will not be a future reliable retirement income 
source. Black individuals from young cohorts, however, demonstrate very slight improvement. 
Additionally, while the levels of assets for White and Other respondents are similar to the overall 
averages across all age profiles, the levels of assets for Hispanic and Black respondents are 
significantly lower than the overall averages. For example, the overall averages of the two 
retirement asset metrics for Baby Boomers, Gen Xers, and Millennials in their 30s were 
approximately $40,000, $57,000 and $15,000, respectively. Black Baby Boomers, Gen Xers, and 
Millennials in their 30s, however, had on average about $9,500, $13,000 and $4,500, 
respectively, and Hispanic respondents of the three cohorts had on average about $6,000, $9,000, 
and $2,500, respectively. Therefore, the data suggest that both Black and Hispanic races on 
average have significantly smaller amounts of assets in comparison to White and Other races, 
particularly throughout their 30s and 40s. Nevertheless, each racial sub-category demonstrates 
similar trends to that of my original analysis, in which the discrepancy between retirement assets 
including and excluding pension wealth is small. 
Figures 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 also reflect similar trends to my original analysis, in which 
all three cohorts for each sub-category—college degree, marital status, sex, and number of 
children—do not accumulate significantly different amounts of retirement assets including 
pension wealth as compared to retirement assets excluding pension wealth, at the various points 
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in the lifecycle. Similar to Black and Hispanic respondents, however, those who did not graduate 
college, are either female or male and neither married nor living with a partner, and have fewer 
than two children, have lower mean averages for both retirement asset metrics. Single males, 
however, had accumulated more assets across all age profiles than single females, although their 
accumulation still lagged behind those who were married. Therefore, similar to the racial sub-
groups, college, sex, and marital status sub-categorical analysis shows similar overall 
accumulation trends across cohorts for each age profile, but depending on the specific category, 
some have significantly lower levels of assets. 
Finally, from Figures 18, 19, 20, and 21, total retirement assets including pension wealth 
do not significantly differ from retirement assets excluding pension wealth, regardless of the 
number of children. Respondents with two or more children, however, had on average more 
retirement assets, both including and excluding pension wealth, as compared with the overall 
averages. On the other hand, respondents with fewer than two children had slightly lower 
retirement assets than the overall analysis. This finding is particularly apparent when the cohorts 
were in their 30s and 40s. Additionally, particularly in their 30s and 40s, elder generations 
accumulated greater retirement wealth than younger cohorts. Overall, depending on the number 
of children, levels of retirement wealth significantly differed from the overall averages, across all 
age profiles. Nevertheless, the difference between retirement assets including and excluding 
pension wealth did not greatly differ depending on the number of children of a respondent. 
 From this demographic analysis of the two retirement asset metrics, it is apparent that 
regardless of demographic subcategories except for the number of children, different sub-
demographic cohort groups do not significantly demonstrate different asset accumulation 
behavior at the same points in the life cycle, as shown in my initial analysis. Moreover, 
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retirement assets including and excluding pension wealth are very similar, regardless of the sub-
demographic group. The data, however, do show that the overall levels of such assets can greatly 
differ depending on the sub-group. Nevertheless, in that particular subgroup, consistent asset 
levels, both including and excluding pension wealth, are evident across cohorts at certain ages.  
 
Discussion in Terms of Preparedness Benchmarks 
 Given that the younger generations—Gen Xers and Millennials—have not thus far shown 
an increase in retirement assets, despite the future unreliability of pension and Social Security 
income, it is important to consider retirement preparedness benchmarks in the context of these 
results. As previously discussed, the National Retirement Risk Index (NRRI) suggest that about 
half of today’s working families are at risk of maintaining their pre-retirement standard of living 
throughout retirement (Munnell et al, 2014). In order to maintain such standard of living, 
however, the NRRI predicts that families of all income levels must on average seek a target 
replacement rate of 73 percent (Munnell et al, 2014). Given the future unreliability of both 
pensions and Social Security benefits, however, my analysis indicates that it is worrisome for 
younger cohorts, as their retirement asset and wealth accumulation does not greatly differ from 
that of the Baby Boomers, and in many instances, actually lags behind. Therefore, my analysis 
confirms that younger cohorts seem to be less prepared for future retirement, given the similarity 
in levels of retirement assets at the same points in the life cycle across cohorts. With very little 
difference in saving behaviors between generations, younger generations will be incapable of 
retiring with a 70 percent replacement rate if they do not increase private saving.  
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V.   CONCLUSION 
The overarching question this research seeks to answer is: because younger generations 
will not be able to rely as much on Social Security and Defined Benefit plans for retirement 
income as older generations, are the younger cohorts making any progress in terms of saving for 
retirement on their own? While there are many related economic studies about the savings 
behavior of different cohorts, such literature lacks dynamic analyses of how retirement saving 
and preparedness compare at certain points in the lifecycle across cohorts. Therefore, I use the 
Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to analyze how retirement wealth and 
preparedness at certain ages varies amongst three different cohorts: the Baby Boomers (1946-
1964), Gen Xers (1965-1980), and Millennials (1981-2000). Ultimately, I find that while 
younger cohorts, including Gen Xers and Millennials, outsave older generations, these younger 
cohorts have not significantly accumulated greater retirement wealth than Baby Boomers at early 
points in the lifecycle. This finding suggests that younger cohorts have lower returns on their 
savings as compared to elder generations. This finding is consistent across the five demographic 
subgroups in my analysis, including race, college, sex, marital status, and number of children.  
There are possibilities of further research beyond this study. Given the different points of 
the lifecycle of the various three cohorts, overlap of the three generations is limited, which 
therefore limited my study. As Millennials continue to age throughout their 40s, 50s, and 60s, a 
more dynamic analysis can be conducted to compare retirement saving and preparedness to that 
of elder cohorts. Additionally, changes in the state of Social Security and private savings will no 
doubt continue to persist, which will provide interesting context as the younger cohorts age. 
This current study has important implications for future policy. Understanding the 
differences in retirement wealth accumulation across generations at various points in the life 
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cycle will help inform policy makers when certain generations have fallen behind and therefore 
when those cohorts could benefit from changes in the saving structure. Moreover, because 
younger cohorts’ retirement preparedness mirrors that of elder cohorts across age profiles, and 
because such younger cohorts cannot expect as much as out of the sources of retirement income 
upon which the elder ones most rely, changes to the saving structure are necessary. A possible 
exploration for policy makers to consider is auto-escalation, which would automatically force 
individuals to contribute increasing amounts to their retirement saving accounts. Auto-escalation 
is relevant given the increasing participation rates of younger cohorts in DC plans despite their 
lower balances. Additionally, exploring policy to increase returns for younger generations, 
especially given their tendency to conservatively invest, will be key to increasing their retirement 
wealth. Therefore, while this study sought to examine whether retirement saving and wealth has 
changed over time for different cohorts, future works that model what retirement wealth levels 
would be by cohort if auto-escalation were in place would be helpful for policy makers. 
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VII.   APPENDICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Author’s calculations from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Author’s calculations from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
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Data Source: Author’s calculations from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Author’s calculations from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
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Data Source: Author’s calculations from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Author’s calculations from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
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Data Source: Author’s calculations from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 1989-2013 
 
